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Abstract 
 
In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.  Since then their 
labor markets have become more dynamic.  This paper studies the implications of such 
reforms for the duration distribution of unemployment, with particular emphasis on the 
changes in the duration dependence.  I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-
sectional data drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyze the 
chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction of fixed-term contracts.  I 
find that duration dependence has increased since such reform.  Semi-parametric estimation 
of the model also shows that for long spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has 
decreased since such reform. 
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Fixed-term Contracts and the Duration
Distribution of Unemployment
Maia Güell
1. Introduction
In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts in order to
fight the high and persistent levels of unemployment that they had been suﬀering since
the mid-1970s. European labor markets have typically been characterized by a wide use of
permanent contracts with high regulated firing costs. The idea behind this policy was to
increase flexibility in the labor market by allowing employers the option of hiring workers
under shorter contracts with negligible firing costs.1
Since their introduction, fixed-term contracts have been widely used and an increasing
number of new jobs are fixed-term (see OECD, 1993). European labor markets have become
more dynamic in terms of inflows and outflows from unemployment to employment, but
the unemployment rate has remained very much unchanged. Much of the existing research
on fixed-term contracts (or temporary contracts, TCs)2 has focused on their eﬀect on un-
employment. There is a wide consensus among economists that the introduction of such
contracts does not necessarily increase employment despite the emergence of a dual labor
market among employed workers.3 In this paper, I study the potential eﬀects of the increased
labor flows due to TCs on the duration distribution of unemployment and the possibility
that the unemployed pool becomes segmented.
Along with the high rates of unemployment, another worrisome feature of European labor
markets is the high proportion of unemployed workers who have been unemployed for a long
period of time (see Machin and Manning, 1999). In Europe, on average, between 1983 and
1994, 48% of the unemployed had been in unemployment for more than 12 months (the
long-term unemployed, LTU), while in the US this proportion was only 9% (see table 1)4.
Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the introduction of TCs has improved the
functioning of the labor market in these terms.
This paper provides some theoretical considerations of the eﬀects of introducing TCs on
the duration distribution of unemployment and then it presents an application to Spain,
which is a striking case in this context. In particular, I analyze the eﬀects of TCs on the
incidence of LTU, on the duration dependence of unemployment and on the outflow rate of
the LTU workers.
In the mid-1980s, Spanish unemployment was around 20% of the labor force, the highest
among OECD countries. In 1984, Spain introduced TCs in an extreme way compared to
other European countries. In particular, while in some countries TCs are restricted to some
1See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1999) for a detailed description of fixed-term contracts regu-
lations in Europe.
2The terms fixed-term contract and temporary contract (TC) will be used interchangeably throughout
this paper.
3See, among others, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999), Alonso-Borrego et al. (1999), Bentolila
and Dolado (1994), Güell (2000) and Saint-Paul (1996).
4Calculations based on countries for which data were available.
type of workers or sectors, there are not such restrictions in Spain. The fact that Spain was
also considered among the most regulated labor markets in the OECD motivated this type
of reform (see OECD, 1994). Figure 1 shows the evolution of the unemployment rate as well
as the increase of the share of TCs for the 1980s and mid-1990s.
A decade after the introduction of fixed-term contracts, the unemployment rate in Spain
was back to pre-reform levels. Moreover, the share of fixed-term employees became the
highest among Europe, around 33%, while the European average was 11% (see table 1). As
a consequence, in 1994, a second reform that restricted the use of TCs was implemented.
So, the Spanish experience between 1980 and 1994 appears to be particularly useful to draw
some lessons about the eﬀects of these types of policies.
Although the eﬀects of TCs on unemployment have been unsatisfactory, there have been
other changes in other dimensions of the labor market that can reasonably be attributed to
these flexibility measures. First, inflows and outflows from unemployment have increased
substantially over this period (see figures 2 and 3). This increase in turnover during this
period has been mainly driven by TCs. After the 1984 reform, on average, as much as 94%
of all newly registered contracts have been TCs (see figure 4); also Bover et al. (1997) and
García-Pérez (1997) find that TCs increase the employment chances of the unemployed in
Spain. As for the inflows back to unemployment, as much as 75% of the unemployed who
have been unemployed for less than 3 months were separated from their jobs because their
fixed-term contract came to an end. Another supporting fact is that, on average, the renewal
rate of TCs into permanent ones has been very low, around 15%, which implies a large flow
from non-renewed workers into unemployment.5 Finally, García-Serrano (1998) studies the
role of TCs in worker turnover in Spain and concludes that these contracts account for the
largest portion of the hiring and separations rates.
The increase of outflows from unemployment has implied a second important change in
the Spanish labor market that has to do with the proportion of unemployed workers with
long unemployment spells, which is also among the highest in Europe (see table 1). The
incidence of LTU typically displays anti-clockwise loops over the business cycle. Figure 5
shows that, for a given unemployment rate, the incidence of LTU in Spain in the early 1990s
is lower than in the mid-1980s. Comparing periods which are at the same point in the cycle,
say from 1983 to 1985 and from 1992 to 1994, it can be seen that there has been a shift
in the unemployment rate-LTU relationship. In fact, this seems to be a common feature in
some European countries (see table 1). As mentioned in Machin and Manning (1999), when
the outflow rate increases at any duration of unemployment, the incidence of LTU tends to
lower. Therefore, the lower incidence of LTU can also be attributed to the increased outflows
since the introduction of TCs.
Previous studies that estimate the probability of leaving unemployment in Spain find that
there is a very strong duration dependence.6 In other words, ceteris paribus, unemployed
workers with shorter unemployment spells have higher probabilities of leaving unemployment
than those with longer spells. An important question remains open. Whether the introduc-
tion of TCs has changed the duration distribution of unemployment through changes in
5See Güell and Petrongolo (2000).
6See, for instance, Alba (1999), Bover et al. (1997), García-Pérez (1997), Jenkins and García-Serrano
(2000) and Machin and Manning (1999).
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duration dependence. This paper aims to analyze the changes in duration dependence of the
unemployed before and after the introduction of TCs in Spain.
Panel data from the Labor Force Survey in Spain is available only after 1987. Therefore,
to analyze the changes in duration dependence before and after the introduction of TCs, I will
use the cross-sectional data drawn from the same survey for the years 1980 to 1994. I exploit
these data following the parametric duration model suggested by Nickell (1979a). In order
to further study if employment chances of TCs have benefited only some of the unemployed
at the expense of others, I estimate a semi-parametric version of Nickell’s model. I discuss
under which conditions such a model can be estimated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical consid-
erations of the introduction of TCs on the duration distribution of unemployment. Section 3
describes the data used. Section 4 provides a duration model for the transition from unem-
ployment to employment. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Considerations
In this section, I consider diﬀerent hiring rules of firms under TCs and their implications
for the duration distribution of unemployment. Firms can either choose randomly among
the pool of unemployed workers or, alternatively, firms can rank applicants by their spells
of unemployment, hiring first those workers with shortest duration of unemployment (see
Blanchard and Diamond, 1994).
The introduction of TCs increases outflows from unemployment since these contracts
are less costly than permanent contracts. As Machin and Manning (1999) show, when the
outflow rate increases at any duration of unemployment, the incidence of LTU tends to lower.
This implies that independently of the hiring rule adopted by firms, the incidence of LTU
will be reduced with the introduction of TCs (as figure 5 shows). The intuition of this result
is that even if TCs did not increase the outflow rate of the LTU, as long as other unemployed
workers with shorter spells get employed, then there is less build-up into longer spells.
However, the diﬀerent hiring rules adopted by firms can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
duration dependence of unemployment. It is important to note that, to the extent that
firms do not hire randomly, there are strong arguments for the fact that duration dependence
might have increased with the introduction of TCs. As Blanchard and Diamond (1994) show,
if firms rank unemployed workers and hire those with the shortest spells of unemployment,
then the exit rate from unemployment is a decreasing function of duration. In the extreme
model where all unemployed workers were homogeneous and only duration of unemployment
influenced workers’ chances to leave unemployment, then the short-term unemployed would
exit first after the introduction of TCs. And when their TC would finish, they would go
back to unemployment and they would again be the unemployed with the shortest spell and
with higher chances of being re-employed than the others.
The econometric model proposed to analyze the changes in duration dependence allows
for several workers’ characteristics to influence the chances of getting a TC and leaving
unemployment. It is worth noting than in the other extreme model where only certain key
characteristics would make unemployed workers more likely to be re-employed with a TC (for
instance, gender, age, education), then, after the reform, workers with such characteristics
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would enjoy higher exit rates than workers without such characteristics. And, as long as
they would maintain these same characteristics, they would continue to have higher exit
rates when they returned to unemployment after the end of their contract. So, workers
without such characteristics would tend to experience longer spells of unemployment than
the others.7
Therefore, to the extent that firms do not hire randomly, TCs will tend to be enjoyed
always by the same group of unemployed workers which implies that the duration dependence
of unemployment will increase. Despite this eﬀect of TCs, this type policy could still be
Pareto eﬃcient if the probability of exiting unemployment of those who do not get a TC
remains unaﬀected. This will be investigated empirically in the next sections by estimating a
semi-parametric version of the econometric model. If that is not the case, then those workers
who do not benefit from the higher employment chances given by TCs will remain stuck in
unemployment, experiencing lower chances of leaving unemployment than before the reform.
Thus, TCs can generate a segmented unemployment pool. That is, some unemployment
workers will be constantly churning from unemployment to employment under TCs, while
the other unemployed workers will not exit unemployment, experiencing longer and longer
durations of unemployment.
3. The Data
I use the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de la Población Activa, EPA), which is car-
ried out quarterly on a sample of some 60,000 households. It is designed to be representative
of the total Spanish population and contains very detailed information about the labor force
status of individuals.
My sample contains data from all the second quarters of each year from 1980 to 1994.
The time span of the sample is an important feature of the data because it will allow me to
analyze the characteristics of the unemployed before and after the introduction of TCs. All
the unemployed people in the sample are asked how long they have been looking for a job.
This search time will be used as the individual’s uncompleted duration of unemployment.
Results will be based on this variable. In steady state, the average uncompleted duration
of unemployment is proportional to the average completed duration of unemployment (see
Layard et al., 1991).
There have been several methodological reforms in the EPA which have implied changes
in the way some questions have been asked as well as the inclusion of more variables over
time. In particular, the way the surveyed unemployed workers are asked about their duration
in unemployment and the possible answers given as options by the EPA questionnaires have
changed three times (see the Appendix A, for details). Also, in the earlier years, the possible
answers were designed in the form of a band (for example, 1 to 3 months). The econometric
model specified will deal with this grouping of the data.8
7I am implicitly assuming that there are no changes in the unobserved characteristics of the population
that influence the chances of leaving unemployment.
8In the previous version of this paper, I aggregated the data after 1987 into the same duration groups as
the earlier data. The results obtained there qualitatively are the same as those presented here (see Güell,
1999).
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As far as the number of variables available is concerned, until 1987 there was no infor-
mation on unemployment benefits or on the reason for previous job loss. These variables
can be particularly important for the analysis of the probability of leaving unemployment.
In order to fully exploit all the relevant information contained in the data, my analysis will
be carried out in two parts. First, I use all the years of the sample, from 1980 to 1994. The
analysis is undertaken with those variables common to all sample years. This first part of
the analysis thus exploits information for a very long time period at the expense of some
relevant variables only available in the most recent years. These additional variables will be
exploited in the second part of the analysis for those years for which they are available, from
1987 to 1994.
Before the 1984 reform, TCs were only allowed for seasonal jobs. One key feature of
the reform was that it allowed the use of TCs for jobs that are not necessarily seasonal.
The higher share of TCs in total employment after the reform can be mainly attributed to
their widespread use in non-seasonal jobs.9 The variable for the reason of previous job loss
distinguishes between the end of a TC and other reasons. Although this variable was not
available before 1987, the workers who were unemployed because their TC ended could only
be those who had held a seasonal TC. Therefore, it can be thought that the reform generated
an exogenous increase in the number of workers who lost their job due to the expiration of a
(non-seasonal) TC.10 Therefore, the reason-for-job-loss is a potential source of identification
of the change in duration dependence after the introduction of TCs.
As will be discussed, one main assumption of the econometric model is that the composi-
tion flow into unemployment is fixed over time. For this reason, I have excluded women from
my sample. Thus, my sample includes all men who are unemployed and who report how long
they have been searching for a job. I will exclude men aged 65 or older because transitions
to non-employment are more likely for this group. Since I want to focus on the eﬀects of TCs
on the existing distribution of unemployment, I will also exclude first-job seekers.11 This
leaves me with a sample of 80,790 unemployed male workers.
Explanatory variables available for the whole sample period include personal character-
istics of the individual such as age, education and marital status, as well as some household
characteristics such as the number of kids and the number of working adults in the household.
Finally, the local unemployment rate is also included to capture business cycle eﬀects.12 This
quarterly regional unemployment rate will be the only time-varying regressor.13 For the sec-
ond part of the analysis, two more variables are available: a dummy variable that indicates
if the worker receives unemployment benefits (UI); and a variable that indicates the reason
for job loss. From this variable, I construct a dummy variable indicating whether the reason
for separation from the previous job was the ending of a TC (end TC). This variable is very
important for my purpose since it can potentially capture all the unemployed workers that
9See Güell and Petrongolo (2000).
10This variable distinguishes between the end of a seasonal TC and a general TC (the TCs introduced
in 1984). Between 1987 and 1994, the number of people who have finished a seasonal TC have remained
constant; while the number of people who have finished a general TC has increased substantially: from 13
percent of the unemployed in 1987 to 26 percent in 1994.
11Alba (1998) estimates the determinants of the employment probabilities of first-job seekers.
12See Bover et al. (1997) for a more detailed study of business cycle eﬀects on unemployment duration.
13Unemployment rate at the regional level includes 50 provinces within Spain.
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enjoy the greater employment chances provided by this type of contract. Separate estimation
of the model will be done for these workers.
Table 2 reports average sample values for the whole sample (column 1) as well as for
each subsample for which a diﬀerent model will be allowed (columns 2 to 7). Column 2
corresponds to the sample for the years before the reform. Columns 3 to 7 correspond to
diﬀerent samples for the years after the reform.14 First, the whole period after the reform
(column 3); column 4 only considers the years 1992 to 1994, which correspond to the years
which are at comparable points of the business cycle as the years before the reform (see figure
5). Column 5 reports the values for the years from 1987 to 1994, for which more variables are
available, and finally, columns 6 and 7 correspond to the unemployed who ended a TC and
the ones who were separated for other reasons for the years 1987 to 1994. The (uncompleted)
duration of unemployment for the diﬀerent sub-samples is also reported. As mentioned, this
should be compared carefully for sample years corresponding to diﬀerent points of the cycle.
For the last two columns, however, it can be seen that people who are unemployed because
of the ending of a TC have about half the (uncompleted) duration of the workers who lost
their job for other reasons.
As will be discussed in the next section, in order to estimate the method proposed by
Nickell (1979a), it is necessary to complement these cross-sectional data with time series
of the inflows into unemployment. I use the monthly registered unemployed and monthly
registered new contracts from the Spanish Employment Oﬃce (INEM) to construct monthly
inflows into unemployment. Since only those unemployed who have worked before can claim
unemployment insurance, first-job seekers generally do not register at the Employment Oﬃce.
This reinforces the exclusion of this group in my analysis.
4. Econometric Specification
My sample has only cross-sectional data on uncompleted spells of unemployment. I will
estimate the hazard rate of leaving unemployment following the method proposed by Nickell
(1979a). The main requirement in order to implement this method is to have historical data
on the inflows into unemployment. The intuition behind this duration model is that the
cross-sectional data represent the unemployed that have “survived” with diﬀerent durations
at time t, while the inflow data represent the population “at risk” at diﬀerent points in time.
Generally, these data are easily available at the aggregate level. As Nickell shows, assuming
that the composition of the flow into unemployment is fixed over time, the model can be
estimated. As it will be discussed later, the frequency of these inflow data is an important
issue to be considered in order to estimate such a model, especially semi-parametrically.
Suppose that the probability of leaving unemployment from time t to time t + 1 for an
unemployed individual i, conditional on having entered unemployment at time t− s and on
being unemployed at t is given by
hi(t, s) = h(xi(ti, s), t, s) (4.1)
14In the previous version of the paper, the period after the reform was separated into two periods according
to the importance of TC in the economy. The results obtained there qualitatively are the same as those
presented here (see Güell, 1999).
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where ti is the date in which the interview took place (in my case, the second quarter of every
diﬀerent year considered) and xi are the relevant characteristics of the individual i, which
include the individual’s regional unemployment rate during all the spell of unemployment.
I have specified h to depend on t. More precisely, I allow the hazard function to be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent time periods. For example, the hazard for the years before the reform can be
diﬀerent from the hazard for the years after the reform. However, within a sub-period, h
does not depend on t. That is, for example, the same function is assumed for the diﬀerent
years prior to the reform (as in Nickell, 1979a).
To write the likelihood, it is necessary to derive the probability for an individual of
being unemployed at time t. First, let Si(t, v) be the probability individual i of and being
(remained) unemployed at time t conditional on having entered unemployed at time t − v.
Therefore
Si(t, v) =
vY
τ=1
(1− h(xi(t, τ ), t, τ )), for v ≥ 1 (4.2)
Suppose that the probability of an individual i of having entered unemployment at time
τ is given by ui(τ). Then the probability of being unemployed at time t, Ui(t), is given by
Ui(t) =
∞X
τ=0
ui(t− τ)Si(t, τ ) (4.3)
It is then possible to write the likelihood for an unemployed individual in my sample,
that is, the probability of having entered unemployment at time t− v conditional on being
unemployed at time t as
Li =
ui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)P∞
v=0 ui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)
(4.4)
As mentioned above, the duration of unemployment is presented in my sample in the
form of bands. That is, given the date of the interview, ti, the individual could have entered
unemployment at any time between ti−ai and ti−bi. Therefore given my data, the likelihood
becomes
Li =
Pbi
v=ai
ui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)P∞
v=0 ui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)
(4.5)
For instance, for someone with unemployment duration between 3 to 6 months, the
numerator of Li has 3 terms. Obtaining prior estimates of ui, say bui, I can then write down
the likelihood for my unemployed sample, of individuals, i = 1, ...., I as
L =
IY
i=1
ÃPbi
v=ai
bui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)P∞
v=0 bui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)
!
(4.6)
7
The probability of individual i, with current characteristics xci, of having entered unem-
ployment at time τ is defined by
ui(τ) = k(x(xci, τ), τ)
aggregate flow into unemployment in month τ
aggregate employment in month (τ − 1) (4.7)
where k(x(.), τ) is the proportion of the inflow into unemployment at time τ with char-
acteristics x. Assuming that k is independent of time, this probability can be estimated
by
bui(τ ) = constant× (aggregate flow into unemployment in month τ) (4.8)
There are two mechanisms by which k(x(., τ ), τ ) is aﬀected over time. First, to assume
that k(x(., τ), .) is constant means to assume that any changes in relevant characteristics over
time are small. This corresponds to the standard assumption of time unvarying regressors.
Second, assuming that k(x(.), τ ) is constant also means that there are small changes in the
proportions of individuals with particular characteristics in the inflow into unemployment.
This point is more diﬃcult to test mainly because, at least to my knowledge, in Spain there
is no data on inflows for the diﬀerent relevant characteristics.15 Nickell points out that the
stability of the aggregate inflow over time can (partly) justify this assumption. This is also
the case within the diﬀerent sub-periods for which the model is estimated.16 In any case, the
lack of detailed breakdowns of the inflow data does not allow to test directly this assumption.
The solution adopted regarding this point has been to exclude women for whom the sta-
tionarity assumption seems particularly strong, specially over the period of study. The only
disaggregation of the inflow data in Spain is by gender. This has allowed me to concentrate
on male inflow data that match my sample from the cross-sectional data.
There is one last thing to be specified in order to compute the likelihood function given
by (4.6). This has to do with the infinite sum in the denominator. I will assume that for long
enough durations, the conditional probability specified in (4.1) does not depend on duration
and that the estimated probability of having entered unemployment is a constant. In par-
ticular, I make these assumptions for durations greater than 36 months. The correspondingbu is the average inflow rate of the calendar year corresponding to 36 months of duration
of unemployment for every individual (u36). Finally, the likelihood to be maximized is as
follows
L =
IY
i=1


Pbi
v=ai
bui(ti − v)Si(ti, v)P36
v=0 bui(ti − v)Si(ti, v) + u36hi(36)Si(ti, 36)

 (4.9)
15Nickell (1979a and 1979b) points out the same problem for the UK.
16For the years before the reform, the average male inflow was 129.3 thousand with standard deviation of
19.9. For the years after the reform, the average male inflow was 238.8 thousand (s.d. of 49.2); from 1985
to 1989, the average male inflow was 195.1 thousand (s.d. of 22.5) and for the years 1990-1994 it was 282.9
(s.d. of 14.8). The latter breakdown for the years after the reform corresponds to the one analyzed in the
previous version of the paper, where the results obtained there qualitatively are the same as those presented
here.
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I will first specify h(t, s) following a proportional hazard model where the underlying
base-line is a Weibull distribution. That is,
hi(t, s) = 1− exp(
Z s+1
s
λ(u)du), where λ(s) = − exp(x0iβ)λ0(s) (4.10)
and
λ0(s) = αsα−1 (4.11)
Note that I have assumed that the frequency of the inflow data allows to make a one—to-
one correspondence between each duration of unemployment (v) at time t and its flow into
such state (t− v). This is because the available inflow data has monthly periodicity.
As mentioned, intuitively, the introduction of TCs would tend to increase the duration
dependence in unemployment. A further question remains to be answered empirically. That
is, whether the introduction of TCs has also implied an increase of employment chances
for some individuals at the expense of some others (or, alternatively, if the chances of the
latter group have remained unchanged in respect to the situation before the reform). The
parametric estimation does not allow us to answer a such question since the base-line hazard
(see (4.11)) monotonically decreases with duration, so changes in the duration dependence
parameter (α) will imply shifts of the whole base-line function. Therefore, this question
needs to be investigated semi-parametrically. Therefore, I will re-estimate the above model
allowing a flexible base-line hazard, that is, I do not specify any functional form for λ0(s).
Given the grouping of the duration data, a step-wise base-line hazard will be estimated
where every step corresponds to each duration group (see the Appendix A, first column).17
It is important to note how the frequency of the inflow data plays a role in the estimation. In
order to estimate the model, it is crucial that each duration group (the population that has
survived and that we observe at time t in the cross-section with duration s) can be matched
univocally with its population at risk, namely the inflow at time t− s. If this condition did
not hold (for instance, if the inflow at t − s could be attached to more than one survival
group) an identification problem would arise since, a given inflow point could correspond to
more than one duration group. In this case, it would not be possible to estimate a separated
step for such group. Let si be the frequency of the inflow data. That is, we observe the
inflow data at period t, t − si, t − 2si, etc. In the cross-section each duration group has
duration s (which depends on how the aggregation of durations is done). It is then crucial
that si ≤ s so that a diﬀerent step can be estimated for each duration group.
When the inflow is less frequent than the duration groups, then the step-wise assumptions
(or even the parametric) will not suﬃce to estimate such model. Further assumptions could
be made to recover, for instance, monthly inflows from quarterly inflows. However, this
would seem to be less appropriate in the semi-parametric case.
In this paper, the inflow data is monthly. The duration groups of the cross-sectional data
vary over time. Before 1987, the grouping of the data is quarterly (except for the first one),
17For comparison reasons, the same steps will be estimated for the years after 1987. Since I want to
concentrate on the last step, I have imposed the same step for the first two duration groups.
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then 6 months and then yearly. After 1987, the grouping is monthly (if duration is less than
2 years) and then yearly. Therefore, there is no identification problem.
5. Empirical Results
I now estimate the hazard of leaving unemployment as modeled in the previous section. First,
I concentrate on changes in the duration dependence and I estimate the Weibull base-line
hazard specified in (4.11). Table 3 reports the estimates for the whole sample, 1980–1994.
Every variable is interacted with a post-reform dummy (d8594, which takes value 1 for years
from 1985 to 1994). The duration dependence parameter is statistically diﬀerent before and
after the reform. Table 8 reports the duration dependence estimates for these subsamples.
And figure 6 plots the hazard of leaving unemployment for the reference category estimated
by this regression for the years before and after the reform. As can be seen, in the years
after the reform the duration dependence of unemployment is much higher than before. For
durations of less than 5 months, the probability of leaving unemployment are much higher
than before. But the reverse is true for durations of 6 months or more.
The eﬀects of the individual characteristics on the probability of exiting unemployment
are fairly standard and consistent with previous studies (see Alba, 1999, and Bover et al.,
1997). The re-employment probability decreases with age. Being married substantially in-
creases the probability of finding a job. This has to do with lower reservation wages of these
individuals given their household responsibilities and for the same reason their attachment to
the labor market is strong. Similarly, the eﬀect of the number of kids is positive, but small.
Also, the eﬀect of the number of working adults in the household is negative, but again, not
very large. The estimated coeﬃcients on education are negative for the pre-reform years,
but positive afterwards. Bover et al. ( 1997) find that secondary education has no significant
eﬀect while a university degree has a positive eﬀect on the re-employment probabilities. My
result may be partially explained by the fact that very few people with a university degree
are among the unemployed before the reform. Alba (1999) finds that the variable education
increases the likelihood of re-employment only for workers with vocational education.
In the period after the reform, there are some years of expansion (from 1985 to 1991) and
some years of recession (from 1992 to 1994). As mentioned before, the LTU typically displays
anti-clockwise loops over the cycle, and this can imply that the duration dependence is higher
in expansion years because the proportion of LTU is higher. Indeed, when estimating the
probability of leaving unemployment for the post reform period with each variable interacted
with a recession dummy (d9294, which takes value 1 for the recession years), I find that this
is the case (see table 4). However, comparing the estimated parameter of the duration
dependence for the recession years, it is still lower than in the pre-reform period (see table
8, column 4).18
A further check of the increase of duration dependence after the introduction of TCs,
despite the fact there are some expansion years in the post reform period, is to compare the
years 1983 and 1992, which are the most comparable in terms of unemployment rates. Table
18Testing that the duration dependence parameter in these recession years is the same as in the pre-reform
period (that is, α = 0.849) gives the test statistic z = 13.51. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at
standard levels of significance.
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5 reports these estimates, where d92 takes value 1 for the year 1992. As can be seen, the
main result still holds.
The number of variables available in the Spanish Labor Force Survey has increased over
time. Therefore, I estimate a second set of regressions in which more variables are included
for the period 1987–1994. The inclusion of more variables can aﬀect the estimated duration
dependence parameter. Therefore, it is important to check whether the above result is
aﬀected by the exclusion of these variables. Table 6 displays the results of the estimations
without the UI dummy and the end-of-temporary-contract dummy; the estimations including
only one of the two variables; and the estimation including both variables. As expected, the
parameter of duration dependence increases with the diﬀerent specifications. However, it is
always lower than in the pre-reform period.19
The eﬀects of the variables also included in the previous regressions remain very similar.
As can be seen, the eﬀect of UI is positive. At first glance, this result may be surprising
if one has in mind the standard disincentive eﬀect from job search theory (see Mortensen,
1970 and 1977).20 There are several possible reasons for this result. First, the UI variable
is only an indicator of whether the unemployed person is receiving benefits when being
interviewed. There is wide consensus that the eﬀects of unemployment benefit levels are far
from robust, being in general not very significant and of small size, and that other dimensions
of unemployment compensation may be more important, such as duration of benefits.21
Moreover, given the nature of my data, it is possible that some unemployed people are
interviewed once their UI has already expired and they report they are not recipients of UI.
This biases downwards the negative eﬀect of UI.22
Secondly, Alba (1999) and Bover et al. (1997) find that the eﬀect of receiving unem-
ployment is significant and quite sizeable, but that this eﬀect is reduced over the spell of
unemployment. This can be seen by simply calculating the correlation between UI receipt
and duration of unemployment for diﬀerent durations (see the Appendix B). Indeed, this
correlation is higher at shorter durations, suggesting that the disincentive eﬀect is present
for short durations. But, for long durations not only it is not negligible, but it is negative.
Wadsworth (1990) and Schmitt and Wadsworth (1993) exploit the idea that UI facilitate
search by providing income with which to finance job search eﬀorts (the job oﬀers eﬀect).
These studies compare the search behavior of benefit claimants and non-claimants. They find
that non-claimants search harder during the initial stages of unemployment when benefits
may provide a temporary leisure subsidy to benefit claimants. As unemployment duration
lengthens, search activities fall for both groups, but benefit recipients are able to maintain
a higher level of search eﬀort and therefore have a relatively higher probability of receiving
a job oﬀer. This job oﬀers eﬀect seems to be very strong in my data. A possible reason
19Although these regressions are not strictly comparable, since the inclusion of additional variables modifies
the estimated α upwards, this comparison is more restrictive than it should be.
20However, Toharia (1997) reviews diﬀerent studies on the disincentive eﬀects of UI in Spain and concludes
that, on the whole, the studies available are not conclusive.
21See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for a review.
22On top of that, as pointed out by Alba (1999), this dummy variable takes value zero both for people who
are not registered in the public employment oﬃce and those who are registered but do not receive benefits.
The problem of this data is that some unemployed people may have applied for unemployment benefits but
may not have received a response at the moment of the interview.
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why the cited works on Spain may diﬀer on the eﬀect of UI is the treatment given to the
unemployment duration variable.23 Finally, there was an important reform of the unemploy-
ment benefit system in 1992 which reduced both the level and duration of UI.24 Alba (1999)
finds that the negative incentive eﬀect of benefits on re-employment probabilities is reduced
starting in 1993 and becomes more important from 1994 onwards.
The other new variable included in this second part of the analysis is a dummy that
equals 1 if the reason for separation from the previous job was the ending of a TC (endtc).
As can be seen in table 6, the estimated coeﬃcient on this variable is positive and significant.
This result accords with the idea that TCs have isolated some of the unemployed, making
them more employable than the other unemployed. I investigate this issue further by esti-
mating a model in which every variable is interacted with this dummy (see table 7). As can
be seen, those jobless workers who are unemployed because their TC came to an end have
less duration dependence than the other unemployed (this includes voluntary quits, redun-
dancy, retirement, illness, etc.). Canziani and Petrongolo (2000) estimate a semi-parametric
duration model using the panel version of the Spanish Labor Force Survey data for the
years 1987–1996 and also find that those jobless workers whose TC ended have higher
re-employment probabilities. They also find that job-quitters have higher chances to leave
unemployment than those unemployed who were dismissed in their previous job.25 Jenkins
and García-Serrano (2000) using data from the national unemployment benefit administra-
tion database find that those who entered UI from a TC have much higher re-employment
probabilities than those whose contract was a permanent one.
Table 8, columns 5 and 6, report the duration dependence estimates for those unemployed
for which the reason of separation in their last job was the ending of a TC and for those
for which there was another reason. Figure 7 plots the hazard of leaving unemployment for
these two groups of unemployed workers from these regressions. Unemployed workers who
came from a TC have greater chances of leaving unemployment at any duration than the
others. Secondly, the hazard for those who became jobless because of the ending of a TC is
flatter than for the other groups of individuals. That is, although there is negative duration
dependence, it is much smaller than for those individuals that lost their jobs for other reasons.
These results are also suggestive of the idea that TCs have increased the employment chances
for a group of the unemployed that churns from employment to unemployment frequently.
The remaining unemployed have lower chances of re-employment and these chances get worse
at longer durations.
It is interesting to note that education has an insignificant eﬀect those who ended a TC
while it has a positive significant eﬀect for those who became jobless for other reasons than
the ending of a TC. One possible explanation is that since people who became unemployed
because of the ending of a TC have greater chances of leaving unemployment they are
more attached to the labor market and therefore having a university degree or not does not
23Alba (1999) excludes from his sample unemployed people of more than 36 months. Bover et al. (1997)
treat durations of more than 14 months as censored at 14 months.
24The motivation for this reform was the increased inflows and outflows from unemployment though
temporary contracts, which generated an important deficit in the Spanish unemployment benefit system.
Also, the minimum duration of a temporary contract was raised from six months to one year and consequently
increased the minimum job tenure required for benefits eligibility.
25Kugler and Saint-Paul (2000) find similar results using US data.
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substantially aﬀect the probability of finding a job. Instead, people that became jobless for
other reasons are less attached to the labor market and therefore having a university degree
can improve their chances of becoming employed.
Back to the eﬀects of UI, the coeﬃcient for both groups appears to be positive although
larger for those who became unemployed for reasons other than ending a TC. This is consis-
tent with the mentioned eﬀect of unemployment insurance along the duration of unemploy-
ment because the unemployed workers who became unemployed for other reasons experience
longer durations of unemployment.
All the results found above are suggestive of the fact that the distribution of the duration
of unemployment has become more unequal in the mid-1990s compared to the late 1980s.
A possible explanation for this fact is the introduction of TCs. As mentioned above, these
contracts have implied an increase in the average outflow rate. To the extent that these
contracts have implied that higher employment chances have not been shared equally among
all the unemployed, then the outflow rate of unemployment of those who have not benefited
from TCs will not have increased. The above results suggest that the re-employment chances
of the latter have been reduced. To further investigate this, I will re-estimate the above model
semi-parametrically in order to compare each step of the base-line hazard before and after
the reform without imposing any functional form.
Tables 9a and 9b report the estimates for the whole sample where every variable is
interacted with a post-reform dummy (d8594, which takes value 1 for the years 1980–1994).
This regression is like the one reported in Table 3, except that four diﬀerent steps of the
base-line hazard are allowed. Figure 8 plots the hazard of leaving unemployment for the
reference category estimated by this regression for the years before and after the reform. As
can be seen, in the years after the reform the two last steps of the base-line are lower than in
the years before the reform. This result goes in line with the results that were suggested from
the previous parametric estimations. That is, the fact that conditional on being long-term
unemployed, the chances of leaving unemployment after the reform are lower than before.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed the eﬀects of the introduction of TCs on the duration dis-
tribution of unemployment in Spain, with particular emphasis on the changes in duration
dependence. The motivation was, on the one hand, to study whether this type of policy had
an impact through diﬀerent dimensions of the labor market, given the rather unsuccessful
eﬀect of this type of policy in reducing unemployment. And, on the other hand, since the
introduction of TCs has made the labor market more dynamic, the motivation was also to
study the impact of the increase in inflows and outflows from unemployment to employment
as captured in the duration of the unemployed.
The paper has exploited cross-sectional data available for a very long period of time (from
1980 to 1994) that allows an analysis of the chances of leaving unemployment before and after
the introduction of TCs in Spain. In particular, the idea that the paper has explored is that,
even if the incidence of LTU may be lower due to the increased (average) outflow rate, if the
greater chances given by TCs are not equally distributed among all the unemployed workers,
then the duration of those who remain stuck in unemployment will be higher and higher. I
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have found evidence of this eﬀect.
I also find that the chances of finding a job at any duration are significantly higher for
those unemployed workers who became unemployed due to the ending of a TC in the previous
job than for those unemployed workers who became unemployed for other reasons. And there
is a stronger duration dependence for this latter group. These results again suggest that TCs
have generated an important increase in the (average) outflow from unemployment, but that
only some of the unemployed have enjoyed these greater chances at the expense of the others.
It seems plausible that these changes are driven by the introduction of TCs, since this was
the major institutional change in the time period studied.
It is often argued that a high proportion of LTU is a possible cause of high unemployment
itself. Although this causality has to be analyzed with caution (see Machin and Manning,
1999), in the case of Spain it is possible that the limited success of flexibility measures in
reducing unemployment could be linked to the fact that TCs have not helped to reduce the
duration dependence in unemployment.
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Table 1: Unemployment rate, incidence of LTU and share of TCs for several countries
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Denmark u rate 9.0 8.5 7.1 5.4 5.4 6.1 7.3 7.7 8.4 9.2 10.1 8.2
LTU 33.0 - 39.3 32.9 30.6 28.7 25.9 33.7 31.2 27.0 - 32.1
TCs - 12.5 12.3 - 11.2 11.5 10.0 10.8 11.9 11.0 10.7 12.0
France u rate 8.1 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.4 9.8 9.3 8.9 9.5 10.4 11.7 12.3
LTU 42.2 - 46.8 47.8 45.5 44.8 43.9 38.3 37.3 36.1 34.2 38.3
TCs 3.3 - 4.7 - 7.1 7.8 8.5 10.5 10.2 10.5 10.9 11.0
Germany∗ u rate 6.9 7.1 7.2 6.5 6.3 6.2 5.6 4.8 5.6 6.6 7.9 8.4
LTU 39.3 - 47.9 48.9 48.2 46.7 49.0 46.3 45.5 33.5 - 44.3
TCs 10.0 - 10.0 - 11.6 11.4 11.0 10.5 10.1 10.5 10.3 10.3
Ireland urate 14.0 15.5 16.8 16.8 16.6 16.1 14.7 13.4 14.8 15.4 15.6 14.3
LTU 36.9 - 64.7 65.2 66.4 66.0 67.3 67.2 60.3 - - 64.3
TCs 6.2 - 7.3 - 8.6 9.1 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.5
Italy urate 7.7 8.1 8.5 9.2 9.9 10.0 10.0 9.1 8.8 9.0 10.3 11.4
LTU 57.7 - 65.8 66.1 66.4 69.0 70.4 71.1 67.1 58.2 - 61.5
TCs 6.6 - 4.8 - 5.4 5.8 6.3 5.2 5.4 7.5 6.0 7.3
Portugal u rate 7.8 8.5 8.7 8.4 6.9 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.0 4.2 5.7 7.0
LTU - - 56.0 56.0 56.6 51.2 48.3 48.1 38.3 30.9 - 43.4
TCs - - - 14.4 16.9 18.5 18.7 18.3 16.4 11.0 9.8 9.4
Spain u rate 17.5 20.3 21.7 21.0 20.1 19.1 16.9 16.2 16.4 18.5 22.8 24.1
LTU 52.4 - 56.7 57.6 62.0 61.5 58.5 54.0 51.1 47.4 50.1 56.1
TCs - - - - 15.6 22.4 26.6 29.8 32.2 33.5 32.2 33.7
UK u rate 11.1 11.1 11.5 11.5 10.6 8.7 7.3 7.1 8.8 10.1 10.5 9.6
LTU 47.0 - 47.0 45.9 45.9 44.7 40.8 36.0 28.1 35.4 - 45.4
TCs 5.5 - 7.0 - 6.3 6.0 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.9 6.5
US u rate 9.6 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.3 5.5 6.7 7.4 6.8 6.1
LTU 13.3 - 9.5 8.7 8.1 7.4 5.7 5.6 6.3 11.2 11.7 12.2
Notes: (1) urate is the unemployment rate; LTU is the share of unemployed with spells≥12
months and TCs is the share of workers under a TC among employed; (2)∗Since 1991, data on
Germany and EU include the new German Länder; (3) Source: OECD (1993, 1996 and 1999).
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Table 2: Sample characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1980-94 1980-84 1985-94 1992-94 1987-94 End TC Other reasons
age 35.738 35.010 36.041 36.667 35.926 34.632 36.317
(13.440) (13.267) (13.502) (14.141) (13.603) (13.490) (13.378)
married 0.527 0.551 0.517 0.492 0.497 0.452 0.566
(0.499) (0.497) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.498) (0.495)
second. or 0.326 0.197 0.379 0.476 0.417 0.435 0.268
univ. ed. (0.469) (0.398) (0.485) (0.499) (0.493) (0.496) (0.443)
n. of kids 1.003 1.219 0.914 0.808 0.865 0.881 1.068
(1.253) (1.416) (1.168) (1.047) (1.124) (1.133) (1.307)
n. of working 0.718 0.699 0.728 0.751 0.762 0.766 0.694
adults (0.886) (0.872) (0.891) (0.884) (0.906) (0.911) (0.871)
UI 0.463 0.430 0.441 0.216
(0.499) (0.495) (0.496) (0.411)
end TC 0.713 0.629 1.000 0.000
(0.452) (0.483) (0.000) (0.000)
log local 2.692 2.423 2.803 2.691 2.781 2.800 2.747
unemployment (0.484) (0.512) (0.425) (0.443) (0.441) (0.447) (0.428)
duration of 14.492 12.724 15.227 13.657 15.026 11.897 20.347
unemployment1 (12.887) (11.676) (13.227) (12.333) (13.286) (11.603) (14.241)
Total No. of spells 80,790 23,720 57,070 18,991 44,053 27,740 16,313
1 Uncompleted duration of unemployment. Reported duration for years after 1987 has been grouped
as in previous years.
Note: (1) Standard deviations in brackets; (2) Source: EPA.
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Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
unemployment, Weibull specification: full sample, 1980-1994
Coeﬃcient
α 0.841
(0.023)
α× d8594 -0.346
(0.026)
constant -0.865
(0.104)
constant × d8594 0.952
(0.124)
age -0.011
(0.001)
age × d8594 0.002
(0.001)
married 0.197
(0.026)
married × d8594 -0.215
(0.029)
second. or univ. ed. -0.094
(0.027)
second. or univ. ed. ×d8594 0.151
(0.029)
n. of kids 0.021
(0.007)
n. of kids × d8594 0.026
(0.009)
n. of working adults -0.042
(0.012)
n. of working adults × d8594 0.018
(0.014)
log local unemployment -0.304
(0.021)
log local unemployment × d8594 0.081
(0.025)
mean log-likelihood -2.402
No. of obs. 80,790
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2)The variable d8594 is equal
to 1 for the years 1985 to 1994 and zero otherwise; (3) Source: EPA.
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
unemployment, Weibull specification: post reform sample, 1985-1994
Coeﬃcient
α 0.402
(0.010)
α× d9294 0.257
(0.017)
constant 0.428
(0.061)
constant × d9294 -1.128
(0.101)
age -0.017
(0.001)
age × d9294 0.013
(0.001)
married 0.156
(0.014)
married × d9294 -0.254
(0.021)
second. or univ. ed. -0.070
(0.012)
second. or univ. ed. × d9294 0.143
(0.019)
n. of kids 0.011
(0.005)
n. of kids × d9294 0.081
(0.008)
n. of working adults -0.014
(0.006)
n. of working adults × d9294 0.001
(0.010)
log local unemployment -0.115
(0.013)
log local unemployment × d9294 -0.084
(0.020)
mean log-likelihood -2.668
No. of obs. 57,070
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2) The variable d9294 is equal
to 1 for the years 1992 to 1994 and zero otherwise; (3) Source: EPA.
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Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of
leaving unemployment, Weibull specification: 1983 and 1992
Coef.
α 0.738
(0.034)
α× d92 -0.269
(0.039)
constant -0.384
(0.168)
constant × d92 0.390
(0.211)
age -0.014
(0.001)
age × d92 0.009
(0.002)
married 0.183
(0.037)
married × d92 -0.344
(0.046)
second. or univ. ed. 0.023
(0.036)
second. or univ. ed. × d92 0.105
(0.045)
n. of kids 0.017
(0.011)
n. of kids × d92 0.051
(0.015)
n. of working adults -0.047
(0.017)
n. of working adults × d92 0.028
(0.022)
log local unemployment -0.282
(0.037)
log local unemployment × d92 0.175
(0.048)
mean log-likelihood -2.353
No. of obs. 9,974
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2) The variable d92 is equal
to 1 for the year 1992 and zero otherwise; (3) Source: EPA.
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Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
unemployment, Weibull specification: post reform sample, 1987-1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
α 0.495 0.536 0.615 0.651
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
constant 0.133 -0.133 -0.975 -1.181
(0.050) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056)
age -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
married -0.030 -0.124 0.050 -0.032
(0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011)
second. or univ. ed. 0.054 0.067 0.034 0.046
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
n. of kids 0.057 0.064 0.048 0.053
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
n. of working adults -0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
log local unemployment -0.232 -0.234 -0.027 -0.273
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
unemployment insurance 0.308 0.271
(0.010) (0.010)
end of temporary contract 0.819 0.813
(0.012) (0.012)
mean log-likelihood -2.973 -2.963 -2.911 -2.904
No. of obs. 44,053 44,053 44,053 44,053
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2) Source: EPA.
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Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving unemployment,
Weibull specification: reason separation in the last job, 1987-1994
Coeﬃcient
α 0.503
(0.020)
α× endtc 0.180
(0.023)
constant 0.416
(0.104)
constant × endtc -1.281
(0.121)
age -0.017
(0.001)
age × endtc 0.015
(0.001)
married -0.039
(0.021)
married × endtc 0.019
(0.025)
second. or univ. ed. 0.219
(0.019)
second. or univ. ed. × endtc -0.248
(0.023)
n. of kids 0.062
(0.008)
n. of kids × endtc -0.017
(0.009)
n. of working adults -0.002
(0.010)
n. of working adults × endtc 0.006
(0.012)
unemployment insurance 0.492
(0.019)
unemployment insurance × endtc -0.325
(0.023)
log local unemployment -0.516
(0.020)
log local unemployment × endtc 0.355
(0.024)
mean log-likelihood -2.891
No. of obs. 44,053
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2) The variable endtc is equal to 1
if the reason of last job loss was the ending of a TC and zero if other reasons;
(3) Source: EPA.
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Table 8: Summary of duration dependence estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1980-1984 1985-1994 1985-1991 1992-1994
(I) α 0.841 0.495 0.402 0.659
(0.023) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
Source Table 3 Table 3 Table 4 Table 4
(5) (6)
End TC Other reasons
(II)(∗) α 0.683 0.503
(0.011) (0.020)
Source Table 7 Table 7
(∗)Includes same regressors as in (I) as well as UI dummy.
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2) Source: EPA.
Table 9a: Baseline hazard estimates
spell months Coeﬃcient
step1 1 to 6 -0.569
(0.046)
step1 × d8594 -0.047
(0.054)
step2 6 to 12 -2.321
(0.153)
step2 × d8594 0.422
(0.160)
step 3 12 to 24 -1.222
(0.049)
step3 × d8594 -0.542
(0.059)
step 4 24 to 36 -2.602
(0.070)
step4 × d8594 -0.376
(0.766)
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2) Source: EPA.
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Table 9b: Maximum likelihood semi-parametric estimates of
the probability of leaving unemployment: full sample, 1980-1994
Coeﬃcient
age -0.080
(0.005)
age × d8594 0.014
(0.006)
married 0.147
(0.014)
married × d8594 -0.155
(0.016)
second. or univ. ed. -0.050
(0.014)
second. or univ. ed. ×d8594 0.081
(0.016)
n. of kids 0.012
(0.004)
n. of kids × d8594 0.023
(0.005)
n. of working adults -0.031
(0.006)
n. of working adults × d8594 0.016
(0.008)
log local unemployment -0.204
(0.012)
log local unemployment × d8594 0.036
(0.014)
mean log-likelihood -2.280
No. of obs. 80,790
Note: (1) Standard errors in brackets; (2)The variable d8594 is equal
to 1 for the years 1985 to 1994 and zero otherwise; (3) Source: EPA.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate, proportion of LTU and share of temporary contracts, 1980-1996. Source: EPA.
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Figure 2: Evolution of inflow rates from employment into unemployment, 1980-1994. Source: MLR.
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Figure 3: Evolution of outflow rates from unemployment into employment, 1980-1994. Source: MLR.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the share of fixed-term contracts in new hires, 1987-1998. Source: MLR.
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Figure 5: The incidence of LTU and the unemployment rate, 1980-1996. Source: EPA.
duration in months
 before reform  after reform
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Figure 6: Hazard of leaving unemployment for the reference worker before and after the introduction of TC. Ref.
category: age 35, not married, primary ed. or below, no kids, no working adults in household (see Table 3).
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duration in months
 separation for other reasons  end temporary contract
1 6 12 18 24 30 36
.03
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Figure 7: Hazard of leaving unemployment for workers who became jobless because ending of TC and for other reasons.
Ref. category: age 35, not married, primary ed. or below, no kids, no working adults in household, no UI (see Table 7).
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Figure 8: Hazard of leaving unemployment for the reference worker before and after the introduction of TC. Ref.
category: age 35, not married, primary ed. or below, no kids, no working adults in household (see Table 9a, 9b).
27
References
[1] Aguirregabiria, Victor and César Alonso-Borrego (1999), “Labor contracts and flexibil-
ity: evidence from a labor market reform in Spain”, Universidad Carlos III Working
Paper No 99-27.
[2] Alba, Alfonso (1998): “Re-employment probabilities of young workers in Spain.” Inves-
tigaciones Económicas, 22(2).
[3] Alba, Alfonso (1999): “Explaining the transitions out of unemployment in Spain: the
eﬀect of unemployment insurance”, Applied Economics, 31, 183-193.
[4] Alonso-Borrego, César, Jesús Fernandez-Villaverde and José E. Galdón-Sánchez (1999),
“A general dynamic equilibrium model of temporary contracts”, Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis mimeo.
[5] Atkinson, Anthony B. and John Micklewright (1991): “Unemployment compensation
and labour market transitions: a critical review”, Journal of Economic Literature, 29,
1679-1727.
[6] Bentolila, Samuel and Juan J. Dolado (1994), “Labour flexibility and wages: lessons
from Spain”, Economic Policy, 18, 53-99.
[7] Blanchard, Olivier J. and Peter Diamond (1994), “ Ranking, Unemployment Duration,
and Wages”, Review of Economic Studies, 61, 417-434.
[8] Bover, Olympia, Manuel Arellano and Samuel Bentolila (1997),“Unemployment dura-
tion, benefit duration, and the business cycle”, CEMFI working paper No. 9717.
[9] Canziani, Patrizia and Barbara Petrongolo (2000): “Firing costs and Stigma: A theoret-
ical analysis and evidence from micro data”, forthcoming European Economic Review.
[10] García-Pérez, José Ignacio (1997): “Las tasas de salida del empleo y el desempleo en
España (1978-1993)”, Investigaciones Económicas, vol XXI (1), 29-53.
[11] García-Serrano, Carlos (1998): “Worker turnover and job reallocation:the role of fixed-
term contracts”, Oxford Economic Papers 50, 709-725.
[12] Grubb, David andWilliamWells (1993), “Employment Regulation and patterns of work
in EC countries”, OECD Economic Studies, 21, 7-58.
[13] Güell, Maia (1999): “The eﬀects of fixed-term contracts on the duration distribution of
unemployment: the Spanish case”, mimeo London School of Economics.
[14] Güell, Maia (2000): “Fixed-term Contracts and Unemployment: an Eﬃciency Wage
Analysis”, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, Working Paper No. 433.
[15] Güell, Maia and Barbara Petrongolo (2000): “Workers’ transitions from temporary to
permanent employment: the Spanish case”, Centre for Economic Performance, London
School of Economics, Discussion Paper 438.
28
[16] Jenkins, Stephen P. and Carlos García-Serrano (2000): “Re-employment probabilities
for Spanish men: what role does the unemployment benefit system play?” Institute for
Labour Research Discussion Paper 00/55, University of Essex.
[17] Kugler, Adriana D. and Gilles Saint-Paul (2000): “How do firing costs aﬀect worker
flows in a world with adverse selection”, mimeo.
[18] Layard, Richard, Stephe n J . Nickell and Ri chard Jack man ( 1991) Unempl oyme nt:
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press.
[19] Machin, Stephen and Alan Manning (1999): “The causes and consequences of long-
term unemployment in Europe” in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook
of Labor Economics, Volume 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[20] Mortense n, Dal e T. (1970): “Job search, the d urati on of unemployment and the Phillips
curve”, The American Economic Review, 60, 847-862.
[21] Mortensen, Dale T. (1977): “ Unemployment insurance and job search decisions”, In-
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, 30 (4), 505-517.
[22] Nickell, Stephen J. (1979a): “Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment”,
Econometrica, 47 (5), 1249-1266.
[23] Nickell, Stephen J. (1979b): “The eﬀect of unemployment and related benefits on the
duration of unemployment”, The Economic Journal, 89, 34-49.
[24] OECD (1993), Employment Outlook, Paris.
[25] OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study, Paris.
[26] OECD (1996), Employment Outlook, Paris.
[27] OECD (1999), Employment Outlook, Paris.
[28] Saint-Paul, Gilles (1996), “Dual labor markets, a macroeconomic perspective”, Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[29] Schmitt, John and Jonathan Wadsworth (1993): “Unemployment benefit levels and
search activity”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55 (1), 1-24.
[30] Toharia, Luis (1997), Spain, Labour Market Studies series No. 1, Employment and
Social Aﬀairs, European Commission, Brussels.
[31] Wadsworth, Jonathan (1990): “ Unemployment benefits and search eﬀort in the UK
labour market”, Economica, 58, 17-34.
29
Appendix
A. The duration of unemployment in the EPA
The way in which the unemployed workers have been asked about their duration in
unemployment and the possible answers given by the EPA questionnaires has changed over
time. The table below summarizes these changes:
Table 10: The duration of the unemployment in the EPA
until 1987 (I) 1987 (II) - 1991(I) from 1992 (I)
How long have you How long have you Which day did you
been looking for a job? been looking for a job? start looking for a job?
Less than 1 month If less than 2 years, Month
1 to 3 months number of months
3 to 6 months
6 months to 1 year If 2 years or more, Year
1 to 2 years number of years
2 years or more
B. Unemployment benefits and duration
Table 11: Correlation of UI receipt and
duration of unemployment
1987-1994
all durations -0.109
less than 3 months 0.093
less than 6 months 0.152
more than 6 months -0.184
more than 12 months -0.214
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